

# Software Development in Startup Companies: The Greenfield Startup Model

Carmine Giardino, Nicolò Paternoster, Michael Unterkalmsteiner, *Member, IEEE*, Tony Gorschek, *Member, IEEE*, and Pekka Abrahamsson, *Member, IEEE*

**Abstract**—Software startups are newly created companies with no operating history and oriented towards producing cutting-edge products. However, despite the increasing importance of startups in the economy, few scientific studies attempt to address software engineering issues, especially for early-stage startups. If anything, startups need engineering practices of the same level or better than those of larger companies, as their time and resources are more scarce, and one failed project can put them out of business. In this study we aim to improve understanding of the software development strategies employed by startups. We performed this state-of-practice investigation using a grounded theory approach. We packaged the results in the Greenfield Startup Model (GSM), which explains the priority of startups to release the product as quickly as possible. This strategy allows startups to verify product and market fit, and to adjust the product trajectory according to early collected user feedback. The need to shorten time-to-market, by speeding up the development through low-precision engineering activities, is counterbalanced by the need to restructure the product before targeting further growth. The resulting implications of the GSM outline challenges and gaps, pointing out opportunities for future research to develop and validate engineering practices in the startup context.

**Index Terms**—Software development, startups, grounded theory

## 1 INTRODUCTION

SOFTWARE startups launch worldwide every day as a result of an increase in new markets, accessible technologies, and venture capital [1]. With the term *software startups* we refer to those organizations focused on the creation of high-tech and innovative products, with little or no operating history, aiming to aggressively grow their business in highly scalable markets. Being a startup is usually a temporary state, where a maturing working history and market domain knowledge leads to the analysis of current working practices, thereby decreasing conditions of extreme uncertainty [2].

The research presented in this paper aims at understanding how practitioners engineer software development strategies in startups. We focus on the structure, planning, and control of software projects, in the period from idea conception to the first open beta release. We performed semi-structured, in-depth interviews with CEOs and CTOs from 13 startups, covering a wide spectrum of themes and iteratively adjusted the developed model according to the emerging evidence. With the resulting Greenfield Startup

Model (GSM), we capture the underlying phenomenon of software development in early-stage startups.

New ventures such as *Facebook*, *LinkedIn*, *Spotify*, *Pinterest*, *Instagram*, *Groupon* and *Dropbox*, to name a few, are examples of startups that evolved into successful businesses. Despite many success stories, the vast majority of startups fail within two years of their creation, primarily due to self-destruction rather than competition [3]. Operating in a chaotic, rapidly evolving and uncertain environment, software startups face intense time-pressure from the market and are exposed to relentless competition [4], [5]. To succeed in this environment startups need to be ready to adapt their product to new market demands while being constrained by very limited resources [6].

From an engineering perspective, software development in startups is challenging as they work in a context where it is difficult for software processes to follow a prescriptive methodology [6], [7]. Even though startups share some characteristics with similar contexts (e.g., small and web companies), the combination of different factors makes the specific software development context unique [6], [8]. Therefore, research is needed to investigate and support the startup engineering activities [7], guide practitioners in taking decisions and avoid choices that could easily lead to business failure [9]. However, despite the impressive size of the startup ecosystem [10], the research on software engineering (SE) in startups presents a gap [2].

With the Greenfield Startup Model we aim to contribute to the body of knowledge on startup software engineering. We created the model as an abstraction of reality [11], based on a systematic procedure and grounded on empirical data obtained by the study of 13 cases. While the GSM presents the most significant themes in the development strategies that characterize these startups' contexts, it does

- C. Giardino is with the Faculty of Computer Science, Free University of Bolzano/Bozen, Dominikanerplatz 3, 39100 Bolzano/Bozen, Italy. E-mail: carmine.giardino@gmail.com.
- N. Paternoster, M. Unterkalmsteiner, and T. Gorschek are with the Software Engineering Research Lab Sweden, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Campus Gräsvik, 371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden. E-mail: paternoster.nicolo@gmail.com, {mun, tony.gorschek}@bth.se.
- P. Abrahamsson is with the Department of Computer and Information Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology NTNU, Sem Sælandsvei 7-97491, Trondheim, Norway. E-mail: pekkaa@ntnu.no.

Manuscript received 9 Dec. 2013; revised 27 Sept. 2015; accepted 4 Dec. 2015. Date of publication 16 Dec. 2015; date of current version 20 June 2016.

Recommended for acceptance by R. DeLine.

For information on obtaining reprints of this article, please send e-mail to: reprints@ieee.org, and reference the Digital Object Identifier below.

Digital Object Identifier no. 10.1109/TSE.2015.2509970

not provide guidelines or best practices that should be followed. However, the categories in the GSM and the relations among them can provide a common direction, vocabulary, and model for future research on software development in startups.

Researchers can use the GSM as a starting point to understand how technical debt influences the future growth of startup companies. Furthermore, the model provides a tool to understand the context in which startups operate, which is central when developing methods / models / tools / techniques / practices suited to these types of development efforts. Filling gaps on the state-of-practice in startups is also beneficial for startup practitioners who can apply the discussed strategies to speed up the development initially, although they need also to consider the likely drop-down in performance at a later stage. In this regard, we identified several commonalities between the issues related to software development in startups and the research focused on studying technical debt [12], [13]. This paper makes the following contributions:

- an empirical investigation into the driving characteristics of early-stage startups.
- a rigorously developed model that illustrates how and explains why startups perform engineering activities in a certain manner.
- a discussion on opportunities for future research and potential solutions for the challenges faced by startups.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Background and related work is covered in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the research questions and shows the design and execution of the study. Results are presented in Section 4, illustrating the GSM. Section 5 discusses the most relevant implications of the GSM. Section 6 compares results of the study to state-of-the-art in literature. Section 7 discusses validity threats. The paper concludes in Section 8.

## 2 BACKGROUND

Looking at the number of new business incubators which appeared in the last decade one can estimate the importance of startups [14]. The wave of disruption in new technologies has led non-startup companies to be more competitive, forcing themselves to undertake radical organizational and innovational renewals, in an attempt to behave more like startups [15]. However, the implementation of methodologies to structure and control development activities in startups is still a challenge [16]. Several models have been introduced to drive software development activities in startups, however without delivering significant benefits [6], [16], [17].

Software engineering faces complex and multifaceted obstacles in understanding how to manage development processes in the startup context. Bach refers to startups as “a bunch of energetic and committed people without defined development processes” [18]. Sutton defines startups as creative and flexible in nature and reluctant to introduce process or bureaucratic measures, which may result in ineffective practices [6]. The limitation of resources leads to a focus on product development instead of establishing rigid processes [16], [19]. Attempts to tailor lightweight processes to startups reported failures: “Everyone is busy, and software

engineering practices are often one of the first places developers cut corners” [20]. Rejecting the notion of repeatable and controlled processes, startups prominently take advantage of reactive and low-precision [21] engineering practices [6], [22], [23], [24].

Startups typically develop software services that are licensed to customers rather than products that are sold and customized to a particular client [25]. Market-driven software development (sometimes called packaged software development or COTS software development [26]) addresses issues related to this aspect. Researchers emphasize the importance of time-to-market as a key strategic objective [27], [28] for companies operating in this sector. Furthermore, requirements are “invented by the software company” [29], “rarely documented” [30], and can be validated only after the product is released to market [31], [32]. Hence, failed product launches are largely due to “products not meeting customer needs” [33]. To address this issue, startups embrace product-oriented practices with flexible teams, applying workflows that provide the ability to quickly change direction to the targeted market [6], [19]. Therefore, many startups focus on team productivity, granting more freedom to the employees instead of providing them with rigid guidelines [22], [23], [24].

Can the goals of startups, namely accelerating time-to-market and meeting customer needs, be improved by the use of solid engineering practices customized for startups? Even though this specific question is not the focus of the study presented in this paper, the detailed investigation of state-of-practice is a prerequisite for future research into enabling the engineering taking place in startups.

### 2.1 General Lack of Research in Startups

Sutton [6] noted in 2000 a general lack of studies in this area, claiming that “software startups represent a segment that has been mostly neglected in process studies”. Further evidence for this observation is provided by Coleman and O’Connor [16], [17], [34] in 2008. A systematic mapping study (SMS) [2] performed in 2013 identified only a few studies into software engineering practices with focus on startups. Moreover, the identified studies are highly fragmented and spread across different areas rather than constituting a consistent body of knowledge. The following sections discuss the findings of the SMS.

### 2.2 Software Development in Startups

Carmel [35] introduced the term *startup* to the SE literature in 1994, studying the time-to-completion in a young package firm. He noticed how these companies were particularly innovative and successful, advocating research to investigate their software development practices and enabling replication of their success by transferring their practices to other technology sectors.

Software startups are product-oriented in the first period of their development phase [19]. Despite good early achievements, software development and organizational management increase in complexity [36], [37] causing deterioration of performance over time. Briefly, the necessity of establishing initial repeatable and scalable processes cannot be postponed forever [38]. Starting without any established workflows [9], startups grow over time, creating and stabilizing processes to eventually improve them only when sufficiently mature [3].

As startups have little time for training activities, as discussed by Sutton [6], the focus shifts from prescriptive processes to team capabilities, hiring people who can “hit the ground running” [39]. Empowering the team and focusing on methodological attributes of the processes oriented towards prototyping, proof-of-concepts, mock-ups and demos, testing basic functionalities, have been the priority in startups [35]. With the startups’ growth, coordinated quality control and long-term planning processes become necessary [39].

Tingling [40] studied the extent to which maturity of a company affects process adoption. He reports on introducing Extreme Programming (XP) principles [41] in the development process, and the challenges arising from the need of trained team-members to fully implement the methodology. Similarly, da Silva and Kon [42] were only able to start with all the XP practices in place after six months of coaching the team. Nevertheless, even then, customization of practices need to be implemented, adapting the processes to the startups context [43].

Contributions to flexibility and reactivity of the development process exist by means of Lean [44] and Agile [45] methodologies (also reported in [46], [47]). Startups face uncertain conditions, leading to a fast learning from trial and error, with a strong customer relationship, and avoiding wasting time in building unneeded functionality and preventing exhaustion of resources [6], [48], [49]. Customer involvement in software development has also been discussed by Yogenra [50] as an important factor to encourage an early alignment of business concerns to technology strategies.

However, the question remains, to what extent can improved practices in, e.g., requirements engineering contribute to shortening time-to-market or improve target market accuracy. There have been initiatives to optimize practices for a specific purpose. McPhee and Eberlein [51] introduced practices adapted for reducing time-to-market. Cohen et al. looked at development performance and time-to-market trade-off [52]. None of these studies focus on startups per se, but show that there is current knowledge that could be useful for startups, or at least can function as a starting point for performing research into solutions for startups.

In conclusion, since “all decisions related to product development are trade-off situations” [49], startups generally optimize workflows to the dynamic context they are involved in. Startups typically adopt any development style that might work to support their first needs, following the “Just do it” credo [53]. As remarked by Coleman and O’Connor [16], “many managers just decide to apply what they know, as their experience tells them it is merely common sense”. This, however, does not preclude the possibility to collect, package and transfer experience in a lightweight manner, that allows flexible adoption of good engineering practices. On the contrary, startups that cannot benefit from very experienced team members would increase their success potential by following validated work practices.

### 2.3 Software Process Improvement (SPI) in Startups

The problem of one-size-fits-all, related to some SPI representations for startups, is described by Fayad [54]. He discusses the problem in actuating the same best-practices criteria for established companies in 10-person software startups. Sutton [6] remarks that problems of rigid SPI models in software

startups arise due to: the dynamic nature of the development process, which precludes repeatability; organizational maturity, which cannot be maintained by startups lacking corporate direction; severe lack of resources, both human and technological for process definition, implementation, management, and training. In conclusion, the primary benefits of one-size-fits-all SPI often do not hold for startups, which instead of promoting product quality, aim to minimize time-to-market.

Additionally, the role of rigid SPI has been neglected because it is seen as an obstacle to the team’s creativity and flexibility, and to the need of a quick product delivery process environment [17]. Product quality is often left aside in favor of minimal and suitable functionalities, shortening time-to-market. Mater and Subramanian [55] and Mirel [56] report that the quality aspects mostly taken in consideration in internet startups are oriented towards usability and scalability. However, market and application type heavily influence the quality demand [16], [57].

To maintain the development activities, oriented towards limited but suitable functionality, studies suggest externalizing the complexity of parts of the project to third party solutions by outsourcing activities [58], software reuse [59] and open-source strategies [60], [61].

### 2.4 Technical Debt

A new stream of SE research, trying to tackle the problem of technical debt [62], brings and encompasses various implications in studying development in software startups. The metaphoric neologism of technical debt was originally introduced by Cunningham in 1992 [63] and has recently attracted the attention of SE researchers.<sup>1</sup> Brown et al. [65] provides an illustration of the technical debt concept: “The idea is that developers sometimes accept compromises in a system in one aspect (e.g., modularity) to meet an urgent demand in some other aspects (e.g., a deadline), and that such compromises incur a “debt” on which “interest” has to be paid and which the “principal” should be repaid at some point for the long-term health of the project”. Tom et al. [62] identified five dimensions of technical debt: code, design and architecture, environment, knowledge distribution and documentation, and testing. On a daily basis startups face a trade-off between high-speed and high-quality engineering, not only in architecture design but in multifaceted aspects (weak project management, testing, process control). In the context of early-stage startups, we illustrate empirical evidence on accumulated technical debt in Section 4.7 and discuss its implications in Section 5.4.

### 2.5 Terminology

To set a common ground and to prevent ambiguity, we use the following terminology throughout the paper:

- *Software development strategy*: the overall approach adopted by the company to carry out product development.
- *Engineering activities*: the activities needed to bring a product from idea to market. Traditional engineering

1. Important contributions characterizing the “debt landscape” are [12], [13] published at a dedicated workshop [64] organized by the Software Engineering Institute and ICSE.






Fig. 1. Research methodology—Grounded theory process overview.

activities are, among others, requirement engineering, design, architecture, implementation, testing.

- *Engineering elements*: any practice, tool or artifacts contributing to and supporting the engineering activities.
- *Quality attributes*: those overall factors that affect runtime behavior, system design, and user experience. They represent areas of concern that have the potential for applications to impact across various layers and tiers. Some of these attributes are related to the overall system design, while others are specific to run time, design time, or user centric issues [66].
- *Growth*: an increase in company size with respect to the initial conditions for either employees or users/customers, and product complexity for handling an increasing number of feature requests.
- *Software product*: any software product and/or software service.
- *Software process improvement*: any framework, practice, or tool that supports activities leading to a better software development process [67].

### 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study is to understand how software development strategies are engineered by practitioners in startup companies. In particular, we are interested in structure, planning and control of software projects, in the period from idea conception to the first open beta release of the software product.

We set the boundaries of the research by reusing a previously conducted systematic mapping study [2], which steered also the formulation of research questions:

RQ-1: How do startups structure and execute their main engineering activities?

RQ-2: How are product quality attributes considered by startups?

To answer these questions, we investigated the software development approach undertaken by practitioners of startups. Following a Grounded Theory (GT) methodology [68], we executed 13 semi-structured interviews (with 13 companies) integrated with follow-up questionnaires. We tailored

the questionnaires to each startup, partially taking advantage of the repertory grid principles [69]. From this, we elaborated and extracted the Greenfield Startup Model explaining the underlying phenomenon of software development in startups.

Following the GT principles, we captured the most relevant aspects of software development from startup practitioners, letting a theory emerge from the interviews and adjusting the research hypotheses and questions as we proceeded. During these interviews we collected data related to engineering activities undertaken by startups. Then, we proceeded with the analysis of the data, finding important relations among concepts with a formal approach to generate and validate the final theory [68].

As suggested by Coleman, in view of the different versions of GT, researchers should indicate which “implementation” of the theory is being used [34]. Since information obtained from the SMS and our direct experience with startup companies provided a good initial level of knowledge, in this study we use Corbin and Strauss’ approach [70]. This GT version empowers the researchers’ “theoretical sensitivity” [71], and encourages them to outline the research problem beforehand.

Fig. 1 shows a complete overview of the study methodology and execution, illustrating how we tailored the general GT methodology to our specific needs. The produced data collection and analysis packages (including interview questions, follow-up questionnaires and codes) are available in the supplemental material of this paper [72].

The results of our previous SMS provide input to the study design, contributing to the *Design and Execution* of the study. The process depicted in Fig. 1 is evolutionary and affects the design at each new iteration. In *Data Collection* we integrate the empirical results in a case study database and subsequently process it in *Data Analysis* to form theoretical categories. At each iteration, the emergent theory is updated following a formal procedure, *Paradigm Model Generation*, and after verifying that we achieved *Theoretical Saturation*<sup>2</sup> of categories, we proceeded to *Theory Validation*.

2. The point at which executing more interviews would not bring any additional value for constructing the theory.

TABLE 1  
Characteristics of the Studied Companies

ID	Company age in months	Founding team (developers)	Current employees	First product building time in months
C1	11	4 (2)	11	6
C2	5	2 (2)	6	3
C3	18	4 (4)	4	6
C4	17	3 (2)	11	6
C5	20	2 (1)	4	12
C6	30	3 (2)	4	1
C7	12	2 (1)	7	4
C8	24	4 (3)	16	4
C9	5	5 (4)	5	1
C10	43	6 (4)	9	4
C11	36	3 (3)	6	2
C12	12	3 (3)	3	3
C13	24	2 (2)	20	3

The first two authors jointly executed the whole procedure, handling conflicts by reviewing the rationale of decisions with the third and fourth authors. When necessary we performed an in-depth review of the study design and data collected during the execution process. The process details are described in the following sections, structured according to the five macro phases depicted in Fig. 1.

### 3.1 Design and Execution

In this paper we address technical aspects related to software development in startups, exploring their operational dynamics. Lacking agreement on a unique definition of the term *startup*, we sampled case companies according to the recurrent themes characterized in the definition of startups [2]:

- newly created: with little or no operating history.
- lack of resources: with economical, human, and physical limited resources.
- uncertainty: with little knowledge of the ecosystem under different perspectives: market, product features, competition, people and finance.
- aiming to grow: with a scalable business in increasing number of users, customers and company's size.

We sampled the companies in two distinct phases. First we executed an initial convenience sampling [73], which led to the identification of eight companies. Then we included five additional startups during the theory formation process (theoretical sampling), iteratively improving the sample according to the emerging theory. The characteristics of the sampled companies are reported in Table 1.

All companies, except C10, were founded within the last three years (2009-2012), by an average of three founding members, who were in majority developers. Moreover, the number of current employees shows how, to different degrees, companies expanded the initial teams. All companies, except C5, released their first product to the market within six months of the idea conception. The products consist of pure web (8), web- and mobile (4), and web- and desktop applications (1), launched in six different nations (United States (4), Italy (4), Germany (2), Sweden (1), United Kingdom (1), New Zealand (1)). The growing team size and publicly available data suggest a generally healthy status of the businesses. A detailed documentation about the startup

sampling and their distribution can be found in the supplemental material of this paper [72]. We executed the case studies online, supported by tools for video conferencing, recording each session which lasted 1 hour on average. The interview subjects were CEOs or CTOs. When selecting interviewees, we required that they worked at the company from the start. We followed a step-by-step work-flow, consisting of the actual interview, preparation of the customized follow-up questionnaire and the iterative adjustment of the interview package artifacts.

### 3.2 Data Collection

We designed the data collection to allow for triangulation, which integrates multiple data sources (interview, questionnaire) converging on the same phenomenon. The interview questions (see Table 10 in the supplemental material [72]) cover aspects such as development process, requirements elicitation, quality requirements, analysis, design, implementation, testing and deployment. After transcribing an interview, we sent a follow-up questionnaire to the interviewee. We designed the questionnaire to capture additional data, gather missing information and confirm interview results by triangulation. Note that we did not use the data from the follow-up questionnaire as input for theory generation. Table 11 in the supplemental material, available online, shows the prototype of the questionnaire that we adapted to each interviewee and company, based on the data collected in the earlier interview.

The case study database allowed us to easily retrieve and search for information, assembling the evidence from different data sources, as described also by Yin [74]. We constructed and stored the database using the qualitative data analysis software package AtlasTI.<sup>3</sup> We overlapped interviews with questionnaire results to reveal and flag potential inconsistencies in the data.

### 3.3 Data Analysis

The first two authors led the coding procedure and performed the analysis in a co-located environment, i.e., working together on a single computer screen. Before starting the analysis, a data ordering procedure was necessary as interviews were spread across a multitude of topics. Therefore, we structured the transcripts into thematic areas according to different topic cards used during the interviews. We proceeded horizontally to analyze the same thematic areas within different transcripts, rather than going through an entire transcript at one time. Once the data was ordered, we coded the interviews according the following steps:

- We assigned labels to raw data, and carried out a first low-level conceptualization using both in-vivo and open coding [75].
- We grouped concepts together into theoretical categories and subcategories. By means of axial coding we first described the different relations between subcategories, and then relations between subcategories and categories.
- We refined categories several times to create different levels of abstraction and adjusting concepts, aided by a simple knowledge management tool.

3. Available online at <http://www.atlasti.com/>.

- We validated consistency among categories by selective coding, exploring and analyzing links among subcategories.
- We identified the core category—the one with the greatest explanatory power – by analyzing the causal relations between high-level categories.

During data extraction we used in-vivo coding combined with the more descriptive procedure of open coding. Following the example of other grounded theories, developed in related areas such as Information Systems [76] and Software Process Improvement [77], we performed the high-level conceptualization during creation of categories, in the process of refining axial and selective coding. As we were iterating through the interviews, we analyzed new data by updating codes and categories when necessary, and taking notes in the form of memos to adjust the emerging theory.

After the coding process, we formalized a first representation of the GT experience map in a theoretical model. The model is presented in the form of categories and subcategories that are linked together according to cause-effect relationships [71]. The formation of the theoretical model is a bottom-up approach. From the empirical data and coding process, the model developed into two different levels: a detailed level representing the network of subcategories (identified mainly by the axial coding process), and a high-level representation of the main categories network (identified mainly by the selective coding process).

### 3.4 Paradigm Model Generation

As mentioned in Section 3.1, we tested emergent theories by integrating additional companies into the sample, selected following the principle of theoretical sampling [74].

We used the process of paradigm modeling, introduced by Corbin [71], at each iteration together with interview execution, systematically analyzing the emerging theory. The paradigm model is composed of:

- *Causal conditions*: the events which lead to the occurrence of the phenomenon, that is our core category.
- *Context*: set of conditions in which the phenomenon can be extrapolated.
- *Intervening conditions*: the broader set of conditions with which the phenomenon can be generalized.
- *Action/interaction strategies*: the actions and responses that occur as the result of the phenomenon.
- *Consequences*: specification of the outcomes, both intended and unintended of the actions and interaction strategies.

Within the limits of the critical bounding assumptions, the role of the generated theory is to explain, predict and understand the underlying phenomenon.

### 3.5 Theory Validation

Presenting a grounded theory is challenging for a researcher, who must pay attention to structure the included level of detail, and to the way data is portrayed displaying evidence of emergent categories. To assess our study and to determine whether the GT is sufficiently grounded, we used a systematic technique to validate the theory. Strauss and Corbin provided a list of questions to assist in determining how well the findings are grounded [70]:

- Q1 Are concepts generated, and are the concepts systematically related?
- Q2 Are there many conceptual linkages and are the categories well developed?
- Q3 Is variation<sup>4</sup> built into the theory and are the conditions under which variation can be found built into the study and explained?
- Q4 Are the conditions under which variation can be found built into the study and explained?
- Q5 Has the process been taken into account, and does the theory stand the test of time?
- Q6 Do the theoretical findings seem significant, and to what extent?

In the remainder of this section, we illustrate how we answered these six questions. We generated the concepts according to the described coding process (Q1) and systematically related them through the use of a network diagram (Q2). At each iteration of the grounded theory process, we considered and examined a concept within different conditions and dimensions, trying to incorporate data from a broader range of practitioners (Q3). We constructed all the linkages and categories by the use of Atlas.TI and compared them according to the data analysis process. Moreover, we connected extensive explanations, in form of in-vivo statements as reported by practitioners, to the developed concepts (Q4).

We designed the research process in multiple steps, explaining the purpose and implementation of each. Thus, the same process together with the supplemental material of this paper [72] enables other researchers to replicate our study within similar contexts (Q5). Moreover, we performed a comparison with the state-of-art to validate the theory and to strengthen its applicability within a wider time-frame (Q6). By this comparison we highlight the areas which have been neglected by existing studies, providing possible directions for future studies (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Furthermore, we studied the confounding factors which could interfere with the application of the GSM (see Section 6.3).

## 4 RESULTS: GREENFIELD STARTUP MODEL

The GSM captures the underlying phenomenon of software development in early-stage startups. The model is formed by 128 sub-categories, clustered in 35 groups, and finally in seven categories (see Fig. 2) at the highest level of abstraction.<sup>5</sup> By the means of the GSM we provide explanations of the development strategies and engineering activities undertaken by startups. This section focuses on the data collected from the studied startups, forming the GSM. Note that in this section, we report on the GSM which is an abstraction of the collected empirical data from thirteen startups. The implications of the GSM and its validity are discussed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.

### 4.1 Model Overview

We have grouped the main concepts representing the underlying phenomenon together to form high-level categories. Fig. 2 shows the network of causal relationships

4. Variation refers to the variety of contexts to which the theory can be applied.

5. All raw data, including codes, sub-categories and groups, are available in the supplemental material [72].




Fig. 2. Main categories and causal relationships in the Greenfield Startup Model.

(represented by arrows) between categories (represented by blocks).

In the forthcoming explanation of the GSM we make use of identifiers (i.e., CATx) for the main categories shown in Fig. 2. The network is centered around the core category, *speed up development*, which is the most interconnected node in the theory reflecting the fact that “it is the one [category] with the greatest explanatory power” [70].

A contextual condition, which characterizes to some extent every startup is the *severe lack of resources*. In fact, limited access to human, time and intellectual resources constrain the capabilities of an early-stage startup to support its development activities. The *severe lack of resources* forces the company to focus on implementing an essential set of functionalities. This is one of the main reasons why the *product quality has low priority* with respect to other more urgent needs.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, to be able to deal with such constraints, startups depend on a small group of capable and motivated individuals.

As unanimously expressed by respondents, the highest priority is to *speed up the development* as much as possible by adopting a flexible and effective *evolutionary approach*. The low attention given initially to architectural aspects related to product quality facilitates the efficiency of teamwork. This allows startups to have a functioning but faulty product, that can be quickly introduced to the market, starting from a prototype implementation on day-one.

The initial employees are the ingredients which enable high levels of performance in software development. To support a fast-paced production environment, engineers are required to be highly committed, co-located, multi-role, and self-organized. In other words, the *team is the catalyst of development*. With an essential and flexible work-flow, which relies on tacit knowledge instead of formal documentation,

startups can achieve very short time-to-market cycles. However, each line of code, written without following structures and processes, contributes to growing the *accumulated technical debt*, which is further increased by having almost non-existing specifications, a minimal project management and a lack of automated tests.

The consequences of such debt may not be perceived in the initial stages of a startup, where finding the product/market fit as quickly as possible is the most important priority. Startups, which survive to subsequent phases will likely increase their user-base, product size, and number of developers. This will require the company to eventually pay the *accumulated technical debt*, and confront the fact that an *initial growth hinders productivity*.

In the following sections we explain the categories presented in Fig. 2, and conclude in Section 4.9 with the final theory. In the explanations we use identifiers of the companies presented in Table 1 (i.e., C1...C13) to highlight statements made by the interviewees.

## 4.2 Severe Lack of Resources

The concept of *severe lack of resources* characterizes the uncertainty of development strategies in startups and it is composed of three subcategories: *time-shortage*, *limited human resources* and *limited access to expertise*.

Since startups want to bring the product to market as quickly as possible, the resource they are the most deprived of is time. Startups operate under a constant time pressure, mainly generated by external sources (*investor pressure*, *business pressure*) and sometimes internal necessities such as *internal deadlines* and *demo presentations at events*. In this regard, C3 commented: “Investors wanted to see product features, engineers wanted to make them better. Finally the time-to-market was considered more important and the teams’ interests were somehow sacrificed.”

In addition, to compensate for the *limited human resources*, practitioners empower *multi-role and full stack engineers*, as

6. There are some exceptions where the quality aspects actually matter and such cases will be discussed in Section 6.3.



confirmed by C1: “Everyone was involved in any tasks, from mobile to web development, organizing themselves in choosing the part to implement”. The extent to which startups have access to specialized knowledge—both internal and external to the company—is reduced when compared to established software companies. Therefore, to partially mitigate the *limited access to expertise*, startups rely on the external aid of mentors or advisors. Under these strict limitations, most of the decisions related to software development are fundamentally trade-off situations.

### 4.3 Team as the Development Catalyst

Among the different aspects fostering the speed of the development process, the startups’ focus is on the characteristics of the initial team. In startups *developers have big responsibilities*. In fact, *limited human resources*, discussed in CAT7, cause the team-members to be active in every aspect of the development process, from the definition of functionalities to the final deployment.

Engineers in the founding team of startups are sometimes *multi-role* and typically *full-stack engineers*. Multi-role engineers handle both the development and are at the same time responsible for marketing and sales. C1 observed that: “A developer has many responsibilities, and needs to quickly move among a variety of tasks as there is no company hierarchy.” Full-stack engineers can tackle different problems at various levels of the technology stack (*generalist developers instead of specialists*). C11 remarked that: “Instead of hiring gurus in one technology, startups should hire young developers, generalists, that know how to quickly learn new technologies, and quickly move among a huge variety of tasks.”

Moreover, having a *very small and co-located development team* enables members to operate with high coordination, relying on *tacit knowledge* and replacing most of the documentation with informal discussions. Practitioners reported that keeping the development team small helps startups in being fast and flexible, as remarked by C8: “If you have more than 10 people, it is absolutely impossible to be fast”. Then, also *basic knowledge of tools and standards of the working domain and knowing each other before starting the company* support the efficiency of activities by *limiting the need for formalities between team members*.

In every software company, *skilled developers are essential for high speed* development. Especially in startups, the “hacking culture” and a tendency to the “just-do-it” approach allow the team to quickly move from the formulation of a feature idea to its implementation. In this regard, C1 comments: “We had a hacker culture/environment, people hacking stuff without formally analyzing it, but breaking it down and finding a way around.”

A *limited access to expertise* forces the team to rely mainly on their personal abilities, even though interviewees reported that asking mentors for an opinion is a viable practice to aim for feasible objectives. Furthermore, *teams work under constant pressure* mainly constrained by a *tight time shortage*.

Finally, startups present founders-centric structures, and especially in the early-stage, the *CTO/CEO background has high-impact* on the company’s development approach. For instance, in case of an academic background, the CTO might encourage the introduction of some architectural design before the development phase. Even though the CTO/CEO initially guides the development process, most of the

decisions are taken collectively by all members of the team. Then, the CTO/CEO only intervenes in situations where conflicts occur.

### 4.4 Evolutionary Approach

Startups prefer to build an initial prototype and iteratively refine it over time, similarly to the concept of “evolutionary prototyping” [78]. The goal is to validate the product in the market as soon as possible, finding the proper product/market fit. Indeed, startups can focus on developing only parts of the system they want to validate instead of working on developing a whole new system. Then, as the prototype is released, users detect opportunities for new functionalities and improvements, and provide their feedback to developers.

Since *flexibility and reactivity are the main priorities*, the most suitable class of software development approaches are highly evolutionary in nature. As *uncertain conditions make long-term planning not viable*, startups cannot base their work on assumptions without rapidly validating them by releasing the product to market. Uncertainty lies first of all in the team composition. Since the teams are typically small and project knowledge is generally undocumented, even a minor change in their composition (e.g., a developer falls ill) can have a significant impact on the overall product development. Furthermore, startups operate in a continuously evolving environment of competitors and targeted market sectors. Then, to get a competitive advantage in the market, startups typically make use of cutting-edge solutions, characterized by an evolution that cannot be foreseen in the long run. However, user feedback and requests play a special role in daily decisions as main drivers for defining the product features in the short term.

To obtain fast user responses and quickly *validate the product*, startups *build a functioning prototype and iterate it* over time. Quoting C4, “[. . .] you should start with something that is really rough and then polish it, fix it and iterate. We were under constant pressure. The aim was to understand as soon as possible the product market/fit iterating quickly, adjusting the product and releasing fast.” The companies focus on building a small set of functionalities to include in the first version, and *progressively roll-out to a larger number of people with small iterations* (confirmed by C4: “we deploy from 5 to 20 times a day”).

The objective of this evolutionary approach is to avoid wasting time on “over-engineering the system” and building complex functionalities that have not been tested on real users. By releasing a small number of good-enough functionalities (see CAT3) the startup verifies the suitability of the features and understands how to adjust the direction of product development towards actual users’ needs. The first version of the product is typically a prototype containing basic functionalities developed with the least possible effort that validates critical features, enabling the startup’s survival in the short term. Supported by *direct contact and observation of users, automated feedback collection and analysis of product metrics*, startups attempt to *find what is valuable for customers*.

### 4.5 Product Quality Has Low Priority

The interests of software startups, related to the product, are concentrated on building a *limited number of suitable functionalities* rather than fulfilling non-functional requirements.



This strategy allows them to quickly release simple products with less need for preliminary architectural studies.

The quality aspects considered by startups during the development process are geared towards user experience (UX<sup>7</sup>), in particular *ease of use, attractiveness of the UI and smooth user-flow without interruptions*. C11 notes that *UX is an important quality factor*: “When a user needs to think too much on what action should be done next, he will just close the application without returning”. C3 adds: “If the product works, but it is not usable, it doesn’t work”.

The extent to which quality aspects are taken into account might depend on the market sector and the type of application. Nevertheless, realizing a high level of UX is often the most important attribute to consider for customer discovery of evolutionary approaches in view of the *limited human resources and time shortage*, presented in CAT7. C4 confirms: “None of the quality aspects matter that much as the development speed does.”

To achieve a good level of UX while dealing with lack of human resources and time shortages, startups analyze similar products, developed by larger companies that can afford more rigorous usability studies. Then, the users’ feedback and product metrics begin to have a central role in determining the achieved UX level. Product metrics are typically web-based statistical hypothesis testing, such as A/B testing [79]. Other than UX, some other factors can influence the quality concerns of development:

- The *efficiency emerges after using the product*, letting engineers avoid wasting time in excessive improvements of not-validated functionalities.
- The *product should be reasonably ready-to-scale* to be able to accommodate a potential growth of the user-base. Startups *externalize complexity to third party solutions*, such as modern cloud services, achieving a sufficient level of scalability.
- Realizing high reliability is not an urgent priority as *users are fault-tolerant towards innovative beta products*. In these cases, users typically have a positive attitude towards the product, even though it exhibits unreliable behavior. In this regard, the focus of beta testing is reducing friction between the product and the users, often incorporating usability testing. In fact, the beta release is typically the first time that the software is available outside of the developing organization.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4.6 Speed-Up Development

*Speed up development* represents the core category of the GSM. Firmly grounded as the primary objective of startups, it shows the most important characteristic of developing software in the early stages.

To *speed up development*, startups adopt evolutionary approaches supported by a solid team focusing on implementing a minimal set of suitable functionalities. Startups *keep simple and informal workflows* to be flexible and reactive, adapting to a fast changing environment. The fact that

teams are typically self-organized and *developers have significant responsibilities* facilitates the adoption of informal workflows. The aim to shorten time-to-market restricts potential planning activities, as reported by C8: “Speed was of essence so we didn’t plan out too many details”. To deal with such unpredictability, startups prefer to take decisions as fast as possible, mainly by means of informal and frequent verbal discussions.

Even though Agile principles embrace change, startups often perceive development practices as a waste of time and ignore them to accommodate the need for releasing the product to the market quickly. This approach is possible also in view of a lack of systematic quality assurance activities; startups focus on user experience and other quality aspects, such as efficiency, can be postponed until after the first release.

Another beneficial strategy that startups employ to quickly deliver products is the *externalization of complexity on third party solutions*. Startups make use of third party components (COTS) and open source solutions (for product components, development tools and libraries). They take advantage of external services for the sake of delivering a *product reasonably ready to scale* for possible future growth. Moreover, advanced version control systems are not only used to manage the code-base, but also in task assignment, responsibility tracing, configuration and issue management, automatic deployment, and informal code walkthroughs when issues occur. Even though *the use of well-integrated and simple tools* allows startups to automate many activities and reduce their completion time, drawbacks of such approaches are increased interoperability issues.

Startups further improve development speed by making *use of standards and known technologies* which are widely recognized, well tested, and supported by strong communities. Moreover, the use of standards and frameworks reduces the need for a formal architectural design since most of the solutions are well documented and ready-to-use. C1 stated that: “as long as you use Ruby standards with the Rails framework, the language is clean itself and doesn’t need much documentation”.

Other important factors that positively impact the speed of development are the team’s desire to *create disruptive technologies, to demonstrate personal abilities, and to have the product used in the market*. As reported by practitioners, these factors are essential to enhance the morale of developers and therefore to achieve higher team performance. On the other hand, when a developer is not *able to meet deadlines*, especially in the typical sprint-based environments of Agile, the morale goes down, hindering the development speed.

Finally, the constant pressure under which the company regularly operates, leads the team to often *work overtime to meet deadlines*. But as reported by practitioners, such a way of working can be an effective strategy only in the short term since it can lead to poorly maintainable code and developer burnout in the long run.

#### 4.7 Accumulated Technical Debt

Startups achieve high development speed by radically ignoring aspects related to documentation, structures and processes. C4 stated that: “You have to accept some extent of technical debt and some flawed code so you can move faster. You have to hit the sweet spot of moving very fast

7. According to ISO 9241-210 (Ergonomics of human-system interaction), UX is defined as “a person’s perceptions and responses that result from the use or anticipated use of a product, system or service”.

8. A discussion of the impact of innovative products on the user satisfaction is presented in Section 6.3.

but at the same time without writing code that is so bad that you can't update it anymore."

Instead of traditional requirement engineering activities, startups make use of *informal specification of functionalities* through ticket-based tools to manage low-precision lists of features to implement, written in the form of self-explanatory user stories [80]. Practitioners intensively use physical tools such as post-it notes and whiteboards, which help in making functionalities visible and prioritizing stories based on personal experiences. C4 commented that "[. . .] it is the only way. Too many people make the mistake of sitting down and write big specs and then they build it for four months, realizing the product is not valuable only at the end."

Since startups are risky businesses by nature, even less attention is given to the traditional phase of analysis, which they replace by a *rough and quick feasibility study*. However, this approach has also disadvantages, as observed by C7: "Some months later I started realizing the drawbacks: now that we have to grow, it would be nice to have done some more detailed study. . . But at the same time, maybe if I did the study, I wouldn't have all the agility and flexibility that we have now. It's a big tradeoff." It is generally *hard to analyze risks with cutting-edge technologies*. To find out the feasibility of such cutting-edge projects, startups attempt a first implementation with rough and informal specifications, assuming that the project's complexity will remain limited to a few functionalities, as discussed in CAT3 (Section 4.5). Additionally, by *keeping the product as simple as possible* and learning from competitors' solutions and mistakes, practitioners use their *past experiences in similar contexts to help to assess the feasibility* of the project. Finally, to avoid restrictions on the flexibility of the team, potentially limiting decisions are taken only when strictly necessary and as late as possible. Limiting early decisions can increase the technical debt as commented by C8: "Our biggest shortcoming was a poor initial decision on data structuring which was fundamental as the whole code (and the business logic) relied on it. 95 percent was right, and 5 percent of the data structure was wrong, and caused a lot of troubles (refactoring and re-doing code)."

Another important factor that contributes to *the accumulation of technical debt* is the general *lack of architectural design*, substituted by *high-level mock-ups and low-precision diagrams, describing critical interactions with third-party components only*. In particular, the use of well-known standards, frameworks and conventions removes the need for formal UML [81] diagrams and documentation, and provides a minimum level of maintenance costs. C6 stated that: ". . . with perfect hindsight we should have used a framework to create more maintainability of the code. At the beginning, we didn't use the framework to develop the application faster. We believe that the additional time needed to use the framework would have payed off, because it would have increased understandability of the code structure and decrease the time needed for new developers to start working."

A similar attitude towards verification and validation brings startups to a *lack of automated testing*, which is often replaced by manual smoke tests. Quoting C3, "Trying the product internally allows us to get rid of 50 percent of bugs of important functionalities. Meanwhile, users report bugs of secondary functionalities, eventually allowing us to mitigate the lack of testing. Indeed, staying one week in

production enables us to identify 90 percent of bugs". However, in certain cases where components of the system might cause loss of data or severe damages to the product or users, engineers realize a reasonable level of automatic testing. In such cases, aided by modern automatic tools, they quickly assess the status of the system integration as they add new functionalities to the product.

Startups perceive rigid project management as a "waste of time" that hinders development speed since the *uncertainty makes formal scheduling pointless* (C9 reported that "initial chaos helps to develop faster"). Startups' *minimal project management* is supported by keeping: *internal milestones short and informal, low-precision task assignment mechanisms* and a low cost project metrics (quoting C13, "the only track of progress was made by looking at closed tickets"). In this context *only a final release milestone is viable*, which helps practitioners to remain focused on short term goals and put new features in production.

Finally, one of the categories that contributes most to growing *accumulated technical debt* is the substantial use of informal and verbal communication channels on a daily basis. The high co-location and the fast paced development approach increase the volume of *tacit knowledge* and the severe lack of any kind of documentation. C4 observed in this regard that: "[. . .] the issue of having documentation and diagrams out of the source code is that you need to update them every time you change something. There is no time for it. Instead, there is a huge pay off in having a code that is understandable itself." On the other hand, there are situations where this strategy is not good enough, as observed by C1: "I had problems due to the lack of documentation. The only back-end documentation was the front end-design, so I had to guess what was behind!"

#### 4.8 Initial Growth Hinders Performance

The lack of attention given in the first phases to engineering activities allows startups to ship code quickly. However, if the startup survives, the initial product becomes more complex over time, the number of users increases and the company starts to grow. Under these circumstances the need to control the initial chaos forces the development team to return the *accumulated technical debt*, instead of focusing on new users' requests. Hence, the *initial growth hinders performance* in terms of new functionalities delivered to the users.

When the user base increases, customers become more quality demanding and scalability issues might start to arise. *Company and user size grow* when business events occur, such as: a *new round of funding*, a possible *acquisition*, the release of a *competing product on the market*, or when the project is *open for the first public release*. Therefore, while the project lacks even minimal processes, *the current team is not able to manage increased complexity* of new functionalities and maintain the codebase.

Subsequently, practitioners start considering the need for project management activities, also in view of *hiring new staff members*, as discussed by C13: "[Project management] is strictly necessary if you radically change the team or when the team grows. The informal communication and lack of documentation slow down the process afterwards". Project management becomes even more important when the *focus shifts to business concerns*. Part of the effort, which was

initially almost entirely dedicated to product development, moves to business activities. Moreover, the availability of project information becomes an important issue as the accumulated *tacit knowledge* hinders the ability of new hires to start working on project tasks.

Another factor that slows down performance is that *portions of code need to be rewritten and substantial refactoring of the codebase* is required by increasing product demands. Practitioners realized that some decisions taken (or not taken) during the *rough and quick feasibility study* before starting the implementation, have led to negative consequences on the long term performance and maintainability of the product. The combination of these factors leads to the need to *re-engineer the product*. By re-engineering the systems, startups aim to *increase the scalability of the product/infrastructure* and start to *standardize the codebase with well-known frameworks*. C7 reports that: “To mitigate this (lack of frameworks) I had to make a schema for other developers when we hired them. We had to do a big refactoring of the codebase, moving it from custom php to Django, normalizing the model and making it stick with the business strategy. I had the code in different php servers communicating via JSON, some engineering horror. Now that we are fixing it, it’s really painful. We had to trash some code. However I don’t regret that I didn’t make this choice sooner, it was the only way”.

The *fear of changing a product, which is working*, arises when product complexity increases. The changes to the codebase, to support bug fixing, become highly interrelated with other functionalities and difficult to manage because the product is poorly engineered. Therefore, the fear arises that changing a validated product might cause changes to users’ responses. The increasing number of feature requests leads to the *growing necessity of having a release plan*. Therefore, startups begin to *partially replace informal communication with traceable systems and introduce basic metrics for measuring project and team progress* to establish an initial structured workflow. Yet, C11 stated that: “[. . .] it is still better to have a reasonable drop-down in performance when the team grows than lose time in the beginning”.

#### 4.9 Paradigm Model

To explain and understand the development strategies in early-stage software startups we construct the theory generated and supported by the above presented GSM:

**Theory** *Focusing on a limited number of suitable functionalities, and adopting partial and rapid evolutionary development approaches, early-stage software startups operate at high development speed, aided by skilled and highly co-located developers. Through these development strategies, early-stage software startups aim to find early product/market fit within uncertain conditions and severe lack of resources. However, by speeding-up the development process, they accumulate technical debt, causing an initial and temporary drop-down in performance before setting off for further growth.*

We formed this theory by considering the different elements specified by Corbin and Strauss [71]:

- “Causal conditions” are represented by three main conceptual categories: *product quality has low priority,*

*evolutionary approach and team is the catalyst of development.*

- “Phenomenon” is represented by the core category *speed up development.*
- “Context” is limited to early-stage web software startups operating in conditions of severe lack of resources aiming to early find product/market fit.
- “Intervening conditions” are summarized by the extremely uncertain development environment.
- “Action and interaction strategies” are represented by the accumulation of technical debt.
- “Consequences” lead to a temporary performance drop-off.

## 5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE GSM

In this section we present relevant implications that emerge from the behavior of early-stage startups, formally expressed in the GSM. Although the startups we studied were spread across various nations and market sectors (see Section 3.1), certain patterns emerged. We discuss these patterns with respect to literature and identify possible venues for future research.

### 5.1 Light-Weight Methodology

The most urgent priority of software development in startups is to shorten time-to-market to find the right product/market fit. However, focusing on building and releasing the first version of a product, startups tend to not apply any specific or standard development methodologies or processes. Three interviewees (C5, C7, C13) referenced the Lean startup methodology [53], a highly evolutionary development approach, centered around the quick production of a functioning prototype and guided by customer feedback. However, none of the studied startups strictly followed the complete “build-measure-learn” cycle proposed by the Lean startup methodology. One of the main purposes of Lean is waste reduction, although the identification of waste is not an easy matter as it spans perspectives and time [82]. For example, running a value stream mapping is resource intensive, something that may put off startups. Nevertheless, even though the absence of a basic process might enable startups to focus more on the product, startup companies can take advantage of some engineering activities even in the early stages [83]. For instance, Taipale [46] reports how startups benefited from tailoring some simple XP practices to their needs.

Startups in the early stage apply fast cycles of “build and fix” when necessary to act quickly and decisively enough to get the first response from the market. However, the lack of perceivable cause and effect relationships constrains effective analysis [84]. Hence, applying best practices in a highly uncertain environment might be counter-productive. There is little to analyze yet, and waiting for patterns to emerge can be considered a waste of time. Quickly developing a set of suitable functionalities allows the team-members to present a prototype to a small set of potential customers and investors to start collecting quick feedback and respond accordingly. However, the studied startups do not explicitly follow the step-by-step process of “customer development” defined by Blank [8]. Instead, they absorb and implement the high-level principles from the customer development



methodology, reflected in the GSM by the theoretical category *find the product/market fit quickly*.

From a research perspective, collaboration with startups and technology transfer to those companies is challenging. State-of-the-art technology transfer models require long-term commitment from all participants [85], an investment that might not be acceptable for an early-stage startup. Thus, there is a need to develop and validate technology transfer models adapted to the startup context.

## 5.2 Empowering the Team Members

The Lean startup methodology proposed by Ries [53] emphasizes team empowerment as a critical factor to pursue the development of a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Empowerment allows the team to move rapidly and cut through the bureaucracy, approval committees and veto cultures. However, empowerment cannot be implemented without structure and means to measure performance [86]. Startups can use lightweight tools, for example collection and evaluation of key performance indicators, task management and continuous deployment, to enable information sharing and autonomy creation which are key aspects of empowerment [86].

Seung-Bum [87], unlike to Ries' methodology, structurally differentiates four dimensions that positively impact performance and should be considered in empowerment programs:

- autonomy of taking decisions, where team-members can choose the activities they are interested in;
- responsibility for organizational results or success, keeping track of their own performance;
- information such that team members have influence on making decisions;
- creativity, enabled by a culture where negative results are not punished, but attempts are rewarded;

Different forms of coordination methods utilize the idea of dividing problem and solutions space, like handshaking presented by Fricker et al. [88]. These could also be investigated, especially since the main manager of a startup (CTO/CEO) cannot be involved in all solution decisions [89]. Even though the GSM identifies and explains the startups' focus on characteristics of the initial team, further research is needed to adapt and validate team empowerment programs in the startup context that can foster the speed of development processes.

## 5.3 Focus on Minimal Set of Functionalities

To deliver a product with the right features built in, startups need to prioritize and filter. From an engineering point of view, most startups do not explicitly apply traditional Requirement Engineering (RE) activities to collect and manage requirements. However, by integrating simple techniques such as Persona and Scenario, companies can improve the effectiveness of requirements elicitation even with mostly unknown final users [90], thereby also shortening time-to-market.

Another study suggests that using a lightweight project-initiation framework such as the Agile Inception Deck can help in preventing premature failure of the software project due to a wrong understanding of the project requirements [91].

Looking at RE in general, there are several good practice guidelines that are adapted for small organizations, where the organization can choose what is relevant for them, see, e.g., uniREPM [92]. The key is that even startups can benefit from a limited and fast inventory of good engineering practices.

## 5.4 Paying Back the Technical Debt

To be faster, startups may use technical debt as an investment, whose repayment may never come due. Tom et al. [62] refer to "debt amnesty" as a written off debt when a feature or product fails.

Even though potentially useful in the short-term, over time technical debt has a negative impact on morale, productivity and product quality. Kruchten et al. [93] suggest identifying debt and its causes, e.g., by listing debt-related tasks in a common backlog during release and iteration planning. Tracking technical debt can also be conducted by measuring usability and scalability of the product, paying attention to the customers' behaviors through real-time and predictive monitoring [53].

An alternative to control technical debt with small effort, as stated by many interviewees, is the use of modern coding platforms (e.g., Github) and well-known frameworks. Coding platforms allow developers to integrate several engineering activities such as requirements lists, issue tracking, source control, documentation, continuous integration, release and configuration management. Frameworks include support programs, compilers, code libraries and tool sets to enable the initial development of a project with limited overhead. However, these strategies target only particular dimensions [62] of technical debt, such as environmental and knowledge debt.

Furthermore, to be effective in the selection of third party components and frameworks, startups need to perform an efficient impact analysis of their process configuration. Technology selection frameworks have been used to stimulate innovation [94], as decision making support [95], [96], and in tool selection [97]. However, such approaches need to be adapted to the particular constraints and context of early-stage startups.

## 5.5 Synthesis

With slightly different levels of adherence, the presented implications are reflected in the behavior of most of the companies we studied. The results of this analysis indicate that early-stage startups are far from adopting standard development methodologies. The typical tendency is to focus on the teams' capability to implement and quickly iterate on a prototype, which is released very fast. Thus, in a context where it is hard for even the most lightweight agile methodologies to penetrate, research should focus on the trade-off between development speed and accumulated technical debt [65], which appears to be the most important determinant for the success of an early-stage startup.

Our investigation of early-stage startups opens up several opportunities for further research. Most importantly, the performance drop-down caused by the necessity of returning the accumulated technical debt while expanding the company's operations and structuring mitigation strategies needs to be addressed. This can be achieved by meeting the following four software development objectives:

TABLE 2  
GSM Categories Mapped to Concepts Reported in Related Models

Category	Coleman [34]
CAT1	Experience the lack of rigid engineering activities and documentation. Flexibility and process erosion maintaining simple and informal work-flows.
CAT4	CTOs' and CEOs' background has a great impact on the adopted development process. Nevertheless, team members remain self-organized, able to intervene in all the aspects of the development process without any direct supervision.
CAT5	Verbal communication and lack of heavy documentation and bureaucracy.
CAT6	Nimble and ad-hoc solutions prevent the use of heavy bureaucracy and formal communication strategies, even though the accumulated tacit knowledge is hard to manage and transfer to new hires.
Category	Baskerville [98]
CAT1	Make heavy use of simple tools and existing components.
CAT2	Uncertain conditions make long-term planning not viable. Speed-up development by releasing more often the software and "implanting" customers in the development environment.
CAT3	Tailor the development process daily according to the intense demands for speed, skipping phases or tasks that might impede the ability to deliver software quickly even though producing lower quality software.
CAT5	Invest time in facilitating development of scalable systems by the use of simple but stable architectural solutions.
CAT7	A desperate rush-to-market. A lack of experience developing software under the conditions this environment imposes.
Category	Brooks [99]
CAT1	The most radical possible solution for constructing software is not to construct it at all, taking advantage of what others have already implemented. It is the main strategy, which enables companies to externalize complexity to third party solutions.
CAT2	Avoid deciding precisely what to build but rather iteratively extract and refine the product requirements from customers and users.
CAT3	Starting from simple solutions allows creating early prototypes and control complexity over time.
CAT4	People are the center of a software project and it is important to empower and liberate their creative mind.

- integrating scalable solutions with fast iterations and a minimal set of functionalities (this allows startups to maintain effective planning and realistic expectations)
- empowering team members enabling them to operate horizontally in all the activities of the development environment simultaneously
- improve desirable workflow patterns through the initiation of a minimal project management over time, as a natural result of emerging activities of tracing project progress and task assignment mechanisms
- then, only when the chaos has been initially managed, planning long-term performance by adoption of Agile and Lean development practices.

Eventually, to enable the introduction and adoption of new development methodologies, research is needed on new/adapted technology transfer models from academia and industry to startups' contexts.

## 6 THEORY VALIDATION

In this section we discuss the validity of the GSM by means of cross-methodological observations, as discussed in Section 3.5. As we refer to the GSM's main categories throughout the validation, we list their name and corresponding section where they have been introduced:

- CAT1 Speed-up development (4.6).
- CAT2 Evolutionary approach (4.4).
- CAT3 Product quality has low priority (4.5).
- CAT4 Team is catalyst of development speed (4.3).
- CAT5 Accumulated technical debt (4.7).
- CAT6 Initial growth hinders performance (4.8).
- CAT7 Severe lack of resources (4.2).

### 6.1 Comparison with Other Models

To validate the generalization of the model, we describe conceptualizations derived from the GSM that are supported by previous models developed by Coleman [16], [17], [34], Baskerville [98] and Brooks [99]. Table 2 presents an overview of the comparison, mapping GSM categories to aspects reported in literature.

We refer to Coleman's work since he has conducted similar studies in the context of startups, even though with a different focus. Coleman investigated factors in software development that hinder initiatives of one-size-fits-all software process improvement in a later stage, representing also companies in the expansion phase with more than 100 employees.

Coleman aims to highlight how managers consider two distinct kinds of processes: *essentials* and *non-essentials*. The essential processes are the most closely linked to product development, such as requirements gathering, design and testing. The non-essential processes are those that might be omitted, such as planning, estimating and staging meetings. In particular, he discusses how practices are routinely removed: "With most methodologies and approaches, very few stick to the letter of them and they are always adapted, so we adapted ours to the way we wanted it to work for us, for our own size and scale" [16].

Coleman's network is characterized by the "cost of process" (core category) and all the factors that in management contributed to the lack of software process improvements. The cost of process represents the lack of formal and prescriptive work-flows in development, mainly conducted by verbal communication without heavy documentation or bureaucracy. Coleman reports on the practitioners' perception that

documentation alone does not ensure a shared understanding of project requirements. Moreover, managers perceive rigid processes as having a negative impact on the creativity and flexibility of the development team. This is in accordance with our generated theory, which bases the reasons for adopting evolutionary and low-precision engineering elements on the flexibility and reactivity attributes of the development process in startups.

As also reported in the GSM, the definition of a “minimum process” is not a matter of poor knowledge and training, but rather a necessity that lets the company move faster. “One-size-fits-all” solutions have always found difficulty in penetrating small software organizations [100]. When startups begin establishing any rigid SPI process, they experience process erosions [16], which result in workflows barely satisfying organizational business needs. Software startups favor the use of agile principles in support of creativity and flexibility instead of one-size-fits-all SPI.

Further, Coleman describes a management approach oriented towards “embrace and empower”, consisting of trust in the development staff to carry out tasks with less direct supervision [16]. Nevertheless, software development managers and founders still have an impact on management style and indirectly on the software development process. In early-stage startups, founders are mainly software development managers as CEOs/CTOs and technical practitioners at the same time. As Coleman identified the influence of the founders’ and managers’ background on the software development process, the GSM similarly identifies that the CEOs/CTOs background shapes the high-level strategies adopted in developing the initial product.

Baskerville [98] refers to rigid SPI approaches as typically effective only in large-scale, long-term development efforts with stable and disciplined processes. Internet-speed software development (oriented towards daily builds, aimed at developing a product with high speed) differs from traditional software development. Baskerville studied 10 companies using a Grounded Theory approach. He found that the major causal factors that influence development are a desperate rush to market, a new and unique software market environment, and a lack of experience developing software under the conditions this environment imposes. Even though with different research focus and study context, Baskerville revealed similar causal factors as the GSM (see Table 2). He argues that the dawn of the Internet era has intensified software development problems by emphasizing shorter cycle times as a strategy to efficiently validate a product to the target market.

With a wider focus, Brooks [99] discusses the challenges involved in constructing software products. Brooks divides difficulties in development into essence (inherent to the nature of the software), and accidents (difficulties attending software production that are not inherent). In other words, essence concerns the hard part of building a software through activities such as specification, design, testing. Accidents refer to the labor of representing the software or testing its representation. Brooks claims that the major effort applied by engineers was dedicated towards accident problems, trying to exploit new strategies to enhance software performance, reliability and simplicity of development,

such as the introduction of high-level languages for programming. Despite the great achievements in improving development performance, the “essence” property of the software remained unaltered. The basic mitigation strategies presented by Brooks on the essence (i.e., buy versus build; requirements refinement and rapid prototyping; incremental development; and great teams) accurately fit the GSM (see Table 2), forecasting the state-of-practice in modern startups.

## 6.2 Theoretical Categories and Existing Literature

In this section we extend the theory validation by mapping the categories of the GSM to empirical studies that investigated startup companies. We map the studies’ main contributions to one or more GSM categories (Table 3). We sorted the table according to the number of GSM categories covered by the studies.

Seven out of 37 studies address all GSM categories in their discussion. All studies address at least one GSM category. The majority of the retrieved studies (29) mention issues related to *speed up development* (CAT1), the core category of the GSM. Another common category, addressed by 26 studies, is the *team is the catalyst of development* (CAT4). The importance of people has been widely discussed in other software engineering studies (e.g., Cooper [109], DeMarco [110], Coleman [111], Valtanen [112], Adolph and Kruchten [113], and Cockburn [114]), advocating for the need to empower people. Less than half of the studies mention results related to *product quality has low priority* (CAT3), *accumulated technical debt* (CAT5), and *initial grow hinders performance* (CAT6). This indicates a potential lack of research and suggests directions for future work.

## 6.3 Confounding Factors

The purpose of this section is to identify which confounding factors might threaten the validity of the GSM. While the mapping in Section 6.2 validated the literature coverage of GSM’s categories, here we are interested in those variables that are *not* covered by the GSM and might interfere with the theoretical model positively or negatively [75]. We report those factors identified by the SMS, but not considered by the GSM: creativity and innovation, market requirements and application type, and developer experience, summarized in Table 4.

Understanding the impact of a confounding factor on the interpretation of the model is important for further analyses and use of the GSM. A researcher, using the GSM (Section 4) and its implications (Section 5), has to contextualize his analysis with the startups’ basic demographic and background characteristics. For example, market requirements (see Table 4) might undermine the generalizability of the GSM. In such a scenario, avoiding minimum expectations of quality assurance in “quality critical markets”, such as security in banking services, would profoundly affect the customers’ satisfaction.

## 7 THREATS TO VALIDITY

In this section we discuss the validity of the overall research methodology. We structure the discussion according to Wohlin’s taxonomy [115].



TABLE 3  
GSM Categories' Overlap with the SMS [2]

Author (year)	CAT1	CAT2	CAT3	CAT4	CAT5	CAT6	CAT7	Count	Ref.
Sutton (2000)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[6]
Kajko-Mattson (2008)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[9]
Crowne (2002)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[3]
Coleman (2008)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[17]
Coleman (2008)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[16]
Coleman (2007)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[34]
Carmel (1994)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	[35]
Yoffie (1999)	X	X	X	X	X	X		6	[39]
Zettel (2001)	X	X	X	X			X	5	[101]
Jansen (2008)	X		X		X	X	X	5	[59]
Heitlager (2007)			X	X	X	X	X	5	[19]
Deias (2002)	X	X		X	X	X		5	[43]
Ambler (2002)	X	X			X	X	X	5	[38]
Wood (2005)	X		X	X			X	4	[102]
Tingling (2007)		X		X	X	X		4	[40]
Taipale (2010)	X	X		X	X			4	[46]
da Silva (2005)	X	X		X	X			4	[42]
Mirel (2000)	X		X	X	X			4	[56]
Midler (2008)	X	X		X			X	4	[48]
Tanabian (2005)	X			X			X	3	[22]
Stanfill (2007)	X				X		X	3	[103]
Mater (2000)	X	X				X		3	[55]
Kuvinka (2011)	X	X		X				3	[47]
Deakins (2005)	X	X		X				3	[104]
Yogendra (2002)	X	X						2	[50]
Wall (2001)	X						X	2	[60]
Su-Chuang (2007)	X			X				2	[105]
Steenhuis (2008)				X			X	2	[106]
Sau-ling Lai (2010)		X					X	2	[107]
Kakati (2003)		X		X				2	[24]
Himola (2003)	X						X	2	[49]
Häsel (2010)	X			X				2	[108]
Hanna (2010)	X						X	2	[58]
Bean (2005)	X				X			2	[61]
Kim (2005)		X						1	[57]
Fayad (1997)				X				1	[54]
Chorev (2006)				X				1	[23]
Count	29	22	13	26	18	14	20		

## 7.1 External Validity

One threat to external validity is the selection of subjects interviewed for the study. This threat affects GT, a qualitative research method using semi-structured interviews, and

centered on respondent's opinions. To mitigate this threat we selected interviewees that covered the positions of CTOs and CEOs. Their broad perspectives on their startup organization was the only data taken into consideration in the study.

TABLE 4  
Confounding Factors in the GSM

Confounding factors	Description
Creativity and innovation ([19])	The study reports how product-oriented development, in contrast to process imposition, provides a degree of freedom to the development team that enhances the creativity of developers and augments the innovation capability of the company in the early-stage.
Market requirements ([34]) and application type ([6], [16], [17])	Their main impact is related to the adoption of flexible and reactive solutions for the development process. In particular, the studies refer to the necessity of fulfillment of quality concerns that goes beyond scalability and UX, when requirements are rigidly imposed or the application domain is well-known. In these cases providing low-quality products to final users might determine the failure of a startup.
Developer experience ([3], [39])	Startups often rely at the beginning on clever, but inexperienced developers. However, having team members with deep experience would be a "double-edged sword". Experience might quickly provide structure and maturity to the development process; yet it might cause challenges in managing self-confident overachievers that almost inevitably clash. Consequently, team management might require control and coordination activities that hinder flexibility of the development environment which is essential in early-stage startups.

The majority of the studied startups are successful web companies, introducing a potential bias in the development of the GSM. In particular, we lack the perspective of failed startups that potentially could have provided stronger evidence for the relationships in the GSM. We partially mitigated this threat by comparing the GSM with similar models. The comparison helped in establishing the context to which the study findings can be generalized. In particular the previous model developed by Coleman [16] has allowed us to identify similarities and differences, enabling a broader reasoning related to factors that hinder maturing processes in startups. In addition, we analyzed literature covered by the SMS on startups. However, including companies focusing on, e.g., embedded real time systems or failed startups might have led to different results.

## 7.2 Internal Validity

To enhance internal validity, we created a three-dimensional research framework. Through a Grounded Theory approach, supported by a systematic mapping study, interviews and follow-up questionnaires, we searched for convergence among different sources of information to confirm or contradict the generated theory. Our strategy included also the collection of supporting artifacts (e.g., project plans, meeting notes, bug repositories) to verify the statements made by the interviews. However, none of the companies could provide access to this information. Furthermore, the only a subset (nine out of 13) of the interviewees returned the questionnaire.

To validate the GSM we conducted a comparison of the emergent theory with existing literature and previously developed models. With the theory validation we highlighted and examined similarities, contrasts and explanations [116]. In this regard, Eisenhardt stated: "Tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical level of the theory building from a case study research [ . . . ] because the findings often rest on a very limited number of cases." We identified important confounding factors, related to innovation, market requirements and developer experience (see Section 6.3). These factors are not catered for in the GSM, even though they are regarded (by other studies) to be relevant for the startup context.

We mitigated reporting bias by packaging all needed material for conducting new studies, providing an interview package with instructions available in the supplemental material of this paper [72]. Moreover, two researchers not involved in the execution of the study conducted a peer-review analysis of the theory's constructs. To control distortion during analysis we made extensive use of memos and comparative analysis, through which we were able to check if data fit into the emerging theory and countered subjectivity.

## 7.3 Construct Validity

One threat to this study is a possible inadequate description of constructs. To diminish this risk, the entire study constructs have been adapted to the terminology utilized by practitioners and defined at an adequate level for each theoretical conceptualization. For instance, we defined *Time shortage* in terms of *Investor pressure*, *CEO/business pressure*, *Demo presentations at events* and *internal final deadline* as used by most of the interviewees in the study. Moreover, during

the coding of interview transcripts, we adopted explanatory descriptive labels for theoretical categories, to capture the underlying phenomenon without losing relevant details.

The second important threat is caused by the fact that interviewees might already be aware of the possible emergent theories analyzed by researchers. To reduce this risk, we did not disclose any goal or emergent results to the interviewees.

## 7.4 Conclusion Validity

Grounded Theory has been applied by other researchers in similar contexts to attest relationships among conceptualizations of an examined phenomenon (see [17], [34], [117]). Those relationships should be verified in such a way that emerging findings remain consistent as further data is collected. In particular we were prepared to modify generated categories so that the new data could be adapted into the emerging theory according to the concepts of theoretical sampling and saturation.

According to the theoretical sampling concept, we adjusted our study design and the emergent theory until only marginal results were generated. Moreover, to enhance reliability of the outcome conceptualizations and relations, we conducted the coding of interviews by following a systematic process.

An important issue is related to the fact that the limited number of interviews might not represent the complete scenarios in our study context. This issue is partially mitigated as result of the theoretical saturation concept. Ramer [118], comparing quantitative to qualitative studies, states that: "reaching data saturation, which involves obtaining data until no new information emerges, is critical for obtaining applicability in qualitative research". After attesting that no more relevant information could be gathered from executing additional interviews, we iterated the Grounded Theory cycle one more time, verifying that the explanatory power of the core category was fulfilled.

## 8 CONCLUSION

Startups are able to produce cutting-edge software products with a wide impact on the market, significantly contributing to the global economy. Software development, especially in the early-stages, is at the core of the companies' daily activities. Despite their high failure rate, an earlier systematic mapping study [2] found that the proliferation of startups is not matched by a scientific body of knowledge. To be able to intervene on software development strategies of startups with scientific and engineering approaches, the first step is to understand startups' behavior. Hence, in this paper, we provide an initial explanation of the underlying phenomenon by means of a Grounded Theory study based on 13 cases. We focused on early engineering activities, from idea conception to the first open beta release of the product.

We grounded the Greenfield Startup Model on the hindsight knowledge collected from practitioners with the aim of explaining how development strategies are engineered and practices are utilized in startups. The explanatory capability and correctness of the model has been validated through systematic comparisons with the state-of-the-art. The SMS revealed a multi-faceted state-of-the-art, lacking support for software development activities in startup companies. On the other hand, the study presented in this

paper, provides a broad set of empirical evidence obtained by a Grounded Theory approach.

The overall results of this study found that the driving characteristics of startups were uncertainty, lack of resources, and time-pressure. These factors influence the software development to an extent that transforms every decision related to the development strategies into a difficult trade-off for the company. Moreover, although startups share characteristics with similar SE contexts (e.g., market-driven development, small companies and web engineering), a unique combination of factors poses a whole new set of challenges that need to be addressed by further research. When bringing the first product to market, startups' most urgent priority is releasing the product as quickly as possible to verify the product/market fit, and to adjust the business and product trajectory according to early feedback and collected metrics. At this stage, startups often discard formal project management, documentation, analysis, planning, testing and other traditional process activities. Practitioners take advantage of an evolutionary prototyping approach, using well-integrated tools and externalizing complexity to third party solutions.

However, the need to restructure the product and control the engineering activities when the company grows counterbalances the initial gain of flexibility and speed. If successful, the startup will face growth of customers, employees and product functionalities that leads to the necessity of controlling the initial chaotic software development environment. The most significant challenge for early-stage startups is finding the sweet spot between being fast enough to enter the market early and controlling the amount of accumulated technical debt.

What follows from the GSM are four software development objectives that need to be considered by early-stage startups and researchers seeking to improve state-of-the-art:

- Integration of scalable solutions with fast iterations and minimal set of functionalities.
- Empowerment of the team-members granting them the responsibility and autonomy to be involved in all activities of the development phase.
- Improvement of workflow patterns through the initiation of a minimal project management.
- Adaptation of Lean and Agile development practices after the initial chaotic startup phase.

In this paper we discussed a number of novel challenges for both practitioners and researchers, while presenting a first set of concepts, terms and activities for the rapidly increasing startup phenomenon. By making a comparison with Berry's definition of SE [119], we would like to see the rise of a new discipline—*startup engineering*—which can be defined as *the use of scientific, engineering, managerial and systematic approaches with the aim of successfully developing software systems in startup companies*.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden, and the Free University of Bolzano, Italy, all the participants for their support of this research, and Philip Stastny for proofreading the manuscript.

## REFERENCES

- [1] D. Smagalla, "The truth about software startups," *MIT Sloan Manage. Rev. (USA)*, vol. 45, no. 2, p. 7, 2004.
- [2] N. Paternoster, C. Giardino, M. Unterkalmsteiner, T. Gorschek, and P. Abrahamsson, "Software development in startup companies: A systematic mapping study," *Inf. Softw. Technol.*, vol. 56, no. 10, pp. 1200–1218, Oct. 2014.
- [3] M. Crowne, "Why software product startups fail and what to do about it," in *Proc. Int. Eng. Manage. Conf.*, 2002, pp. 338–343.
- [4] A. Maccormack, "How Internet companies build software," *MIT Sloan Manage. Rev.*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 75–84, 2001.
- [5] K. M. Eisenhardt and S. L. Brown, "Time pacing: Competing in markets that won't stand still," *Harvard Bus. Rev.*, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 59–69, 1998.
- [6] S. M. Sutton, "The role of process in software start-up," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 33–39, Aug. 2000.
- [7] G. Coleman, "An empirical study of software process in practice," in *Proc. Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci.*, 2005, p. 315c.
- [8] S. Blank, *The Four Steps to the Epiphany*. 1st ed. Louisville, KY, USA: CafePress, Feb. 2005.
- [9] M. Kajko-Mattsson and N. Nikitina, "From knowing nothing to knowing a little: Experiences gained from process improvement in a start-up company," in *Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Sci. Softw. Eng.*, 2008, pp. 617–621.
- [10] T. W. Archibald, L. C. Thomas, and E. Possani, "Keep or return? Managing ordering and return policies in start-up companies," *Eur. J. Oper. Res.*, vol. 179, no. 1, pp. 97–113, May 2007.
- [11] R. Frigg and S. Hartmann, "Models in science," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, fall 2012 ed., E. N. Zalta, Ed. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford Univ, 2012.
- [12] A. Nugroho, J. Visser, and T. Kuipers, "An empirical model of technical debt and interest," in *Proc. 2nd Workshop Manag. Techn. Debt*, 2011, pp. 1–8.
- [13] C. Izurieta, A. Vetrò, and N. Zazworka, "Organizing the technical debt landscape," in *Proc. 3rd Workshop Manag. Techn. Debt*, 2012, pp. 23–26.
- [14] R. Grimaldi and A. Grandi, "Business incubators and new venture creation: An assessment of incubating models," *Technovation*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 111–121, Feb. 2005.
- [15] C. M. Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma*. Boston, MA, USA: Harvard Bus. School Press, 1997.
- [16] G. Coleman and R. O'Connor, "An investigation into software development process formation in software start-ups," *J. Enterprise Inf. Manage.*, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 633–648, 2008.
- [17] G. Coleman and R. O'Connor, "Investigating software process in practice: A grounded theory perspective," *J. Syst. Softw.*, vol. 81, no. 5, pp. 772–784, May 2008.
- [18] J. Bach, "Microdynamics of process evolution," *IEEE Comput.*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 111–113, Feb. 1998.
- [19] I. Heitlager, R. Helms, and S. Brinkkemper, "A tentative technique for the study and planning of co-evolution in product," in *Proc. 3rd Int. Workshop Softw. Evolvability*, 2007, pp. 42–47.
- [20] K. Martin and B. Hoffman, "An open source approach to developing software in a small organization," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 46–53, Jan./Feb. 2007.
- [21] A. Cockburn, *Surviving Object-Oriented Projects*. Reading, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley, 1998.
- [22] M. Tanabian, "Building high-performance team through effective job design for an early stage software start-up," in *Proc. Int. Eng. Manage. Conf.*, 2005, pp. 789–792.
- [23] S. Chorev and A. R. Anderson, "Success in Israeli high-tech startups; critical factors and process," *Technovation*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 162–174, Feb. 2006.
- [24] M. Kakati, "Success criteria in high-tech new ventures," *Technovation*, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 447–457, May 2003.
- [25] M. Marmer, B. L. Herrmann, E. Dogrultan, R. Berman, C. Eesley, and S. Blank, "The startup ecosystem report 2012," Startup Genome, 2012.
- [26] B. Regnell, M. Höst, J. N. och Dag, P. Beremark, and T. Hjelm, "An industrial case study on distributed prioritisation in market-driven requirements engineering for packaged software," *Requirements Eng.*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 51–62, 2001.
- [27] J. Natt Och Dag, "Elicitation and management of user requirements in market-driven software development," Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Commun. Syst, Lund Inst. Technol., Lund, Sweden, 2002.



- [28] P. Sawyer, I. Sommerville, and G. Kotonya, "Improving market-driven RE processes," in *Proc. Int. Conf. Product-Focused Softw. Process Improvement*, 1999, pp. 222–236.
- [29] C. Potts, "Invented requirements and imagined customers: Requirements engineering for off-the-shelf software," in *Proc. 2nd Int. Symp. Requirements Eng.*, Mar. 1995, pp. 128–130.
- [30] L. Karlsson, Å. G. Dahlstedt, J. Natt Och Dag, B. Regnell, and A. Persson, "Challenges in market-driven requirements engineering - an industrial interview study," in *Proc. 8th Int. Workshop Requirements Eng.: Found. Softw. Quality*, 2002, pp. 37–49.
- [31] A. Dahlstedt, "Study of current practices in market-driven requirements engineering," in *Proc. 3rd Conf. Promotion Res. IT*, 2003.
- [32] M. Keil and E. Carmel, "Customer-developer links in software development," *Commun. ACM*, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 33–44, May 1995.
- [33] C. F. Alves, S. Pereira, and J. B. de Castro, "A study in market-driven requirements engineering," in *Proc. Workshop em Engenharia de Requisitos*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2006, pp. 61–66.
- [34] G. Coleman and R. O'Connor, "Using grounded theory to understand software process improvement: A study of Irish software product companies," *Inf. Softw. Technol.*, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 654–667, 2007.
- [35] E. Carmel, "Time-to-completion in software package startups," in *Proc. 27th Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci.*, 1994, pp. 498–507.
- [36] M. Lehman, "Programs, life cycles, and laws of software evolution," *Proc. IEEE*, vol. 68, no. 9, pp. 1060–1076, Sep. 1980.
- [37] R. Banker and G. Davis, "Software development practices, software complexity, and software maintenance performance: A field study," *Manage. Sci.*, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 433–450, 1998.
- [38] S. Ambler, "Lessons in agility from Internet-based development," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 66–73, Mar./Apr. 2002.
- [39] D. Yoffie, "Building a company on Internet time: Lessons from netscape," *California Manage. Rev.*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1999.
- [40] P. Tingling, "Extreme programming in action: A longitudinal case study," in *Proc. 12th Int. Conf. Human-Comput. Interaction: Interaction Des. Usability*, 2007, pp. 242–251.
- [41] K. Beck and C. Andres, *Extreme Programming Explained: Embrace Change (2nd Edition)*. Reading, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley, 2004.
- [42] A. da Silva and F. Kon, "XP south of the equator: An experience implementing XP in Brazil," in *Proc. 6th Int. Conf. Extreme Program. Agile Processes Softw. Eng.*, 2005, pp. 10–18.
- [43] R. Deias and G. Mugheddu, "Introducing XP in a start-up," *European Internet Services Company*, 2002.
- [44] N. Gautam and N. Singh, "Lean product development: Maximizing the customer perceived value through design change (redesign)," *Int. J. Prod. Econ.*, vol. 114, no. 1, pp. 313–332, Jul. 2008.
- [45] P. Abrahamsson, O. Salo, J. Ronkainen, and J. Warsta, "Agile software development methods," *Relatório Técnico*, Finlândia, 2002.
- [46] M. Taipale, "Huitale - A story of a Finnish lean startup," in *Proc. 1st Int. Conf. Lean Enterprise Softw. Syst.*, 2010, vol. 65, pp. 111–114.
- [47] K. Kuvinka, "Scrum and the single writer," in *Proc. Techn. Commun. Summit*, 2011, pp. 18–19.
- [48] C. Midler and P. Silberzahn, "Managing robust development process for high-tech startups through multi-project learning: The case of two European start-ups," *Int. J. Project Manage.*, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 479–486, Jul. 2008.
- [49] O.-P. Hilmola, P. Helo, and L. Ojala, "The value of product development lead time in software startup," *Syst. Dyn. Rev.*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 75–82, 2003.
- [50] S. Yogendra, "Aligning business and technology strategies: A comparison of established and start-up business contexts," in *Proc. Internal Eng. Manage. Conf.*, 2002, pp. 2–7.
- [51] C. McPhee and A. Eberlein, "Requirements engineering for time-to-market projects," in *Proc. 9th Int. Conf. Eng. Comput.-Based Syst.*, 2002, pp. 17–24.
- [52] M. A. Cohen, J. Eliasberg, and T.-H. Ho, "New product development: The performance and time-to-market tradeoff," *Manage. Sci.*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 173–186, Feb. 1996.
- [53] E. Ries, *The Lean Startup: How Today's Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses*. Crown Business, 2011.
- [54] M. Fayad, "Process assessment considered wasteful," *Commun. ACM*, vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 125–128, 1997.
- [55] J. Mater and B. Subramanian, "Solving the software quality management problem in Internet startups," in *Proc. 18th Annu. Pacific Northwest Softw. Quality Conf.*, 2000, pp. 297–306.
- [56] B. Mirel, "Product, process, and profit: The politics of usability in a software venture," *ACM J. Comput. Documentation*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 185–203, 2000.
- [57] E. Kim and S. Tadisina, "Factors impacting customers' initial trust in e-businesses: An empirical study," in *Proc. 38th Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci.*, 2005, vol. 07, pp. 1–10.
- [58] R. Hanna and T. U. Daim, "Information technology acquisition in the service sector," *Int. J. Services Sci.*, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 21, 2010.
- [59] S. Jansen, S. Brinkkemper, and I. Hunink, "Pragmatic and opportunistic reuse in innovative start-up companies," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 42–49, Nov./Dec. 2008.
- [60] D. Wall, "Using open source for a profitable startup," *IEEE Comput.*, vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 158–160, Dec. 2001.
- [61] L. Bean and D. D. Hott, "Wiki: A speedy new tool to manage projects," *J. Corporate Accounting Finance*, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 3–8, Jul. 2005.
- [62] E. Tom, A. Aurum, and R. Vidgen, "An exploration of technical debt," *J. Syst. Softw.*, vol. 86, no. 6, pp. 1498–1516, 2013.
- [63] W. Cunningham. (1992). The WyCash Portfolio Management System [Online]. Available: <http://c2.com/doc/oopsla92.html>
- [64] (2013). Fourth International Workshop on Managing Technical Debt [Online]. Available: <http://www.sei.cmu.edu/community/td2013/>
- [65] N. Brown, Y. Cai, Y. Guo, R. Kazman, M. Kim, P. Kruchten, E. Lim, A. MacCormack, R. Nord, I. Ozkaya, R. Sangwan, C. Seaman, K. Sullivan, and N. Zazworka, "Managing technical debt in software-reliant systems," in *Proc. FSE/SDP Workshop Future Softw. Eng. Res.*, 2010, pp. 47–52.
- [66] Microsoft, *Microsoft Application Architecture Guide*. Microsoft Press, Redmond, USA, 2009.
- [67] M. Unterkalmsteiner, T. Gorschek, A. Islam, C. K. Cheng, R. Permedi, and R. Feldt, "Evaluation and measurement of software process improvement: A systematic literature review," *IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng.*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 398–424, Mar./Apr. 2012.
- [68] B. G. Glaser, *Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory*. Mill Valley, CA, USA: Sociology Press, 1978.
- [69] H. M. Edwards, S. McDonald, and S. Michelle Young, "The repertory grid technique: Its place in empirical software engineering research," *Inf. Softw. Technol.*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 785–798, Apr. 2009.
- [70] A. L. Strauss and J. M. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, P. Labella, Ed. Newbury Park, CA, USA: Sage, 1998.
- [71] J. Corbin and A. Strauss, "Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria," *Qualitative Sociol.*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 3–21, 1990.
- [72] C. Giardino, N. Paternoster, M. Unterkalmsteiner, T. Gorschek, and P. Abrahamsson. (2015). Supplemental material to 'Software development in startup companies: The greenfield startup model' [Online]. Available: <http://www.bth.se/com/mun.nsf/pages/greenfield>
- [73] C. W. Dawson, *Projects in Computing and Information Systems A Student's Guide*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 2009.
- [74] R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Newbury Park, CA, USA: Sage, 1994.
- [75] C. Robson, *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. New York, NY, USA: Wiley, 2009.
- [76] W. J. Orlikowski, "CASE tools as organizational change: Investigating incremental and radical changes in systems development," *MIS Quart.*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 309–340, Sep. 1993.
- [77] G. Coleman and R. O'Connor, "Software process in practice: A grounded theory of the Irish software industry," in *Proc. 13th Eur. Conf. Softw. Process Improvement*, 2006, pp. 28–39.
- [78] A. Davis, "Operational prototyping: A new development approach," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 70–78, Sep. 1992.
- [79] S. Borodovsky and S. Rosset, "A/b testing at SweetIM: The importance of proper statistical analysis," in *Proc. 11th Int. Conf. Data Mining Workshops*, 2011, pp. 733–740.
- [80] S. Zhong, C. Liping, and C. Tian-en, "Agile planning and development methods," in *Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Comput. Res. Develop.*, 2011, pp. 488–491.

- [81] R. Pooley and P. King, "The unified modelling language and performance engineering," *IEE Proc. Softw.*, vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 2–10, 1999.
- [82] M. Poppendieck and T. Poppendieck, *Implementing Lean Software Development: From Concept to Cash*. Reading, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley, 2006.
- [83] F. Maurer and S. Martel, "Extreme programming. Rapid development for web-based applications," *IEEE Internet Comput.*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 86–90, Jan./Feb. 2002.
- [84] C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden, "The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world," *IBM Syst. J.*, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 462–483, 2003.
- [85] T. Gorschek, C. Wohlin, P. Carre, and S. Larsson, "A model for technology transfer in practice," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 88–95, Nov./Dec. 2006.
- [86] W. Randolph, "Navigating the journey to empowerment," *Organizational Dyn.*, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 19–32, 1995.
- [87] Y. Seung-Bum and C. Sang Ok, "Employee empowerment and team performance: Autonomy, responsibility, information, and creativity," *Team Performance Manage.*, vol. 15, no. 5/6, pp. 289–301, 2009.
- [88] S. Fricker, T. Gorschek, C. Byman, and A. Schmidle, "Handshaking with implementation proposals: Negotiating requirements understanding," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 72–80, Mar./Apr. 2010.
- [89] S. Fricker, T. Gorschek, and M. Glinz, "Goal-oriented requirements communication in new product development," in *Proc. 2nd Int. Workshop Softw. Product Manage.*, 2008, pp. 27–34.
- [90] M. Aoyama, "Persona-and-scenario based requirements engineering for software embedded in digital consumer products," in *Proc. 13th Int. Conf. Requirements Eng.*, 2005, pp. 85–94.
- [91] J. Rasmuson, "Agile project initiation techniques - the inception deck and boot camp," in *Proc. Conf. AGILE*, 2006, pp. 337–341.
- [92] M. Svahnberg, T. Gorschek, T. Nguyen, and M. Nguyen, "Unirepm: validated and improved," *Requirements Eng.*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 85–103, 2013.
- [93] P. Kruchten, R. Nord, and I. Ozkaya, "Technical debt: From metaphor to theory and practice," *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 18–21, Nov./Dec. 2012.
- [94] R. Rohrbeck, J. Heuer, and H. Arnold, "The technology radar - an instrument of technology intelligence and innovation strategy," in *Proc. Int. Conf. Manage. Innovation Technol.*, 2006, pp. 978–983.
- [95] N. Shehabuddeen, D. Probert, and R. Phaal, "From theory to practice: Challenges in operationalising a technology selection framework," *Technovation*, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 324–335, 2006.
- [96] G. Azzone and R. Manzini, "Quick and dirty technology assessment: The case of an Italian research centre," *Technological Forecasting Social Change*, vol. 75, no. 8, pp. 1324–1338, 2008.
- [97] G. Aranda, A. Vizcaino, A. Cechich, and M. Piattini, "Technology selection to improve global collaboration," in *Proc. Int. Conf. Global Softw. Eng.*, 2006, pp. 223–232.
- [98] R. Baskerville, B. Ramesh, L. Levine, J. Pries-Heje, and S. Slaughter, "Is 'Internet-speed' software development different?" *IEEE Softw.*, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 70–77, Nov./Dec. 2003.
- [99] F. Brooks Jr., "No silver bullet essence and accidents of software engineering," *IEEE Comput.*, vol. C-20, no. 4, pp. 10–19, Apr. 1987.
- [100] M. Staples, M. Niazi, R. Jeffery, A. Abrahams, P. Byatt, and R. Murphy, "An exploratory study of why organizations do not adopt CMMI," *J. Syst. Softw.*, vol. 80, no. 6, pp. 883–895, Jun. 2007.
- [101] J. Zettel, F. Maurer, J. Münch, and L. Wong, "LIPE: A lightweight process for e-business startup companies based on extreme programming," in *Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Product Focused Softw. Process Improvement*, 2001, pp. 255–270.
- [102] D. Wood, "Open source software strategies for venture-funded startups," MIND Laboratory, Univ. Maryland, College Park, MD, USA, Tech. Rep. TR-MS1287, 2005.
- [103] R. Stanfill and T. Astleford, "Improving entrepreneurship team performance through market feasibility analysis, early identification of technical requirements, and intellectual property support," in *Proc. Amer. Soc. Eng. Educ. Annu. Conf.*, 2007.
- [104] E. Deakins and S. Dillon, "A helical model for managing innovative product and service initiatives in volatile commercial environments," *Int. J. Project Manage.*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 65–74, Jan. 2005.
- [105] S.-C. Li, "The role of value proposition and value co-production in new Internet startups: How new venture e-businesses achieve competitive advantage," in *Proc. Portland Int. Center Manage. Eng. Technol.*, 2007, pp. 1126–1132.
- [106] H.-J. Steenhuis and E. de Bruijn, "Innovation and technology based economic development: Are there short-cuts?" in *Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Manage. Innovation Technol.*, 2008, pp. 837–841.
- [107] S.-I. Lai, "Chinese entrepreneurship in the Internet age: Lessons from Alibaba.com," *World Acad. Sci., Eng. Technol.*, vol. 72, pp. 405–411, 2010.
- [108] M. Häsel, N. Breugst, and T. Kollmann, "IT competence in Internet founder teams an analysis of preferences and product innovativity," *Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng.*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 210–217, 2010.
- [109] R. Cooper, "An investigation into the new product process: Steps, deficiencies, and impact," *J. Product Innovation Manage.*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 71–85, 1986.
- [110] T. DeMarco, *Peopleware: Productive Projects and Teams*. 2nd ed. Dorset House, New York, USA, 1999.
- [111] G. Coleman, "eXtreme Programming (XP) as a 'Minimum' software process: A grounded theory," in *Proc. 28th Annu. Int. Comput. Softw. Appl. Conf.*, 2004, pp. 4–5.
- [112] A. Valtanen, "Big improvements with small changes: Improving the processes of a small software company," in *Proc. 9th Int. Conf. Product-Focused Softw. Process Improvement*, 2008, pp. 258–272.
- [113] S. Adolph and P. Kruchten, "Reconciling perspectives: How people manage the process of software development," in *Proc. Agile Conf.*, 2011, pp. 48–56.
- [114] A. Cockburn, "Characterizing people as non-linear, first-order components in software development," in *Proc. 4th Int. Multi-Conf. Syst., Cybern. Informat.*, 1999.
- [115] C. Wohlin, P. Runeson, M. Höst, M. C. Ohlsson, B. Regnell, and A. Wesslén, *Experimentation in Software Engineering: An Introduction*. Norwell, MA, USA: Kluwer, 2000.
- [116] K. M. Eisenhardt and K. M. Eisenhardt, "Building theories from case study research," *Acad. Manage. Rev.*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 532–550, 2007.
- [117] S. Basri and R. O'Connor, "Towards an understanding of software development process knowledge in very small companies," in *Proc. Int. Conf. Informat. Eng. In. Sci.*, 2011, vol. 253, pp. 62–71.
- [118] L. Ramer, "Quantitative versus qualitative research?" *J. Obstetric, Gynecologic, Neonatal Nursing*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 7–8, 1989.
- [119] D. Berry, "Academic legitimacy of the software engineering discipline," *Softw. Eng. Inst., Tech. Rep. CMU/SEI-92-TR-34*, Nov. 1992.



**Carmine Giardino** received the BSc degree in computer science from the University of Salerno in 2010, and the MSc degree in software engineering from the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen and Blekinge Institute of Technology in 2013. He is currently working toward the PhD degree at the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen. His research interests include software startups and information services with focus on trading securities.



**Nicoló Paternoster** received the BSc degree in applied mathematics from the University of Roma - Tor Vergata in 2009 and the MSc degree in software engineering from the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen and Blekinge Institute of Technology in 2013. He is a freelance software engineer and a consultant mainly for early stage startups. His research interest includes software startups and blockchain technology. For more information or contact: <http://adva.io>.



**Michael Unterkalmsteiner** received the BSc degree in applied computer science from Free University of Bozen-Bolzano in 2007, and the MSc and PhD degrees in software engineering from Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH) in 2009 and 2015, respectively. He is a postdoctoral researcher at BTH. His research interests include software repository mining, software measurement and testing, process improvement, and requirements engineering. He is a member of the IEEE. For more information or contact: [www.lmsteiner.com](http://www.lmsteiner.com).



**Tony Gorschek** is a professor of software engineering at Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH). He has over 10 years industrial experience as a CTO, senior executive consultant and engineer, but also as a chief architect and product manager. In addition, he has built up five startups in fields ranging from logistics to internet based services. Currently, he manages his own consultancy company, works as a CTO, and serves on several boards in companies developing cutting edge technology and products. His research interests include requirements engineering, technology and product management, process assessment and improvement, quality assurance, and practical innovation. He is a member of the IEEE.



**Pekka Abrahamsson** received the PhD degree in software engineering from the University of Oulu, Finland, in 2002. He is a full professor of software engineering at the Department of Computer and Information Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway. Prior to his current appointment, he has served as a professor at the Free University of Bozen Bolzano, University of Helsinki and VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. His research interests are in the empirical software engineering, software startups and innovation. He received the Nokia Foundation Award in 2007 for his merits in agile software development research and his European research project on Agile methods in embedded systems received ITEA Achievement Silver award in 2007. He heads today the global Software Startup Research Network. He is a member of the IEEE and ACM.

▷ **For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at [www.computer.org/publications/dlib](http://www.computer.org/publications/dlib).**